IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. of Cape Canaveral, Florida protests the award of a contract to Vectrus Systems Corporation of Colorado Springs, Colorado under the U.S. Department of War’s Request for Proposal No. W91RUS19R0018 (RFP) (RFP), the Army Contract Command, used to support the operation and maintenance services of the Army’s operational base communications information system and its infrastructure to support the United States’ Central Command forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Jordan. IAP questioned the agency’s assessment of the proposal and its decision to award the award without discussion.
The decision to publish the document on the following date is governed by the GAO Protection Order. This version has been approved for public release.
Subject: IAP Worldwide Services, Inc.
Protesters Kara L. Daniels, Esq., Nathaniel E. Castellano, Esq. and Thomas A. Pettit, Esq., Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. Adam K. Lasky, Esq., Edward V. Arnold, Esq., Joseph J. Dyer, Esq. and Bret C. Marfut, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, were the interveners Vectrus Systems Corporation. Wade L. Brown, Esq. and Gwendolyn TD Franks, Esq., the Department of War, are the agency. Evan D. Wesser, Esq. and Edward Goldstein, Esq., GAO's Office of General Counsel participated in the preparation of the decision.
1. A protest that questioned the technically unacceptable evaluation of the protester’s proposal because it failed to fully meet the material performance requirements was rejected because the record reflects that the agency’s evaluation is reasonable and complies with the solicitation terms.
2. In the Department of Defense procurement valued at more than $100 million, if the record supports the agency’s decision that the grant based on the initial recommendation is in the government’s best interest, then the agency’s decision not to discuss it is reasonable.
IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. of Cape Canaveral, Florida protests the award of a contract to Vectrus Systems Corporation of Colorado Springs, Colorado under the U.S. Department of War’s Request for Proposal No. W91RUS19R0018 (RFP) (RFP), the Army Contract Command, used to support the operation and maintenance services of the Army’s operational base communications information system and its infrastructure to support the United States’ Central Command forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Jordan. IAP questioned the agency’s assessment of the proposal and its decision to award the award without discussion.
The RFP was released on April 3, 2019, and was subsequently revised 8 times. Under the operational authority of the 160th Signal Brigade Network Enterprise Technology Command, it seeks advice and support for the operation and maintenance of telecommunications equipment and information systems owned or leased by the U.S. government. Its subordinate units in Southwest Asia and Central Asia theater. Agency Report (AR), Table 7, RFP, Amendment. No. 3, Performance Work Statement (PWS), ¶ C.2.0. The RFP considers awarding a cost plus fixed fee contract that includes two 60-day phased implementation periods, an 8-month base period, and four 1-year selection periods. AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶ B.2.
Taking into account the following evaluation factors, awards will be awarded on the basis of the best value balance: (1) task support/technical methods; (2) past performance; (3) cost; (4) small business participation. AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶ M.1.A. Mission support/technical method factors are more important than past performance factors; past performance factors are more important than cost; cost is more important than small business participation. ID. The combination of non-cost factors is much more important than cost. ID.
In addition, mission support/technical method factors include four sub-factors: (i) management; (ii) technology; (iii) property management; (iv) quality control. Same as above, ¶ M.3. Among the sub-factors, management is more important than technology, and technology is more important than property management and quality control. ID. In relation to this, RFP stipulates that individual sub-factors of management or technical sub-factors rated below "acceptable", or "qualified" bidders of property management or quality control sub-factors will not advance in the source selection process, and Do not consider winning. Id., ¶ M.4. The RFP instructs the offeror to clearly demonstrate that they have the ability to meet all the requirements of the RFP, and warns that the offeror’s failure to provide complete and complete information to prove that the offeror is capable of meeting certain requirements may result in the offer being considered Is unacceptable and therefore not eligible for the reward. ID.
The RFP further instructed that in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 52.215-1, the Army intends to make a ruling without discussion, but reserves the right to discuss it when necessary. Since deficiencies can only be rectified through discussion, RFP warns offerors to “review this tender thoroughly and ensure that their proposal [s] contains [] all necessary information, provides [] all necessary documents, and [yes] Complete aspects." AR, Table 8, RFP, Amendment. No. 4, ¶ L.5.1; see also AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶¶ M.1.A and M.5 (reiterate that the Army intends to award awards without discussion).
As described in this article, only the technical sub-factors under the mission support/technical method evaluation factors are relevant to resolve this protest. Regarding this sub-factor, RFP requires bidders to address three factors. First, the offeror is asked to describe the technical methods they propose to implement the technical requirements of PWS, including:
AR, Table 8, RFP, amendment. No. 4, ¶ L.8.2.B.1.
Second, the offeror is required to prove that they are capable of manning the job. In order to help bidders, RFP included the government estimated staffing and workload data information as an attachment. The bidder was instructed to “not just imitate estimated staffing”, but to “propose an innovative staffing solution based on workload data”. Same as above, ¶ L.8.2.B.2. Suppliers need to provide the overall staffing structure and staffing level by site based on their proposed technical solutions, including a staffing worksheet that contains the following information for each proposed labor category:
Third, the offeror should provide a description of the qualification requirements for the type of workforce that it proposes, and these requirements meet the qualification requirements required to support the PWS technical requirements. Specifically, providers will determine the qualifications, type of experience, education, training, and certification for each workforce category they propose. Bidders need to provide the following information in a specified format for each proposed labor category:
IT/IAT/IAM/other certifications and levels[1]
The Army will evaluate the technical methods proposed by the proponent to implement the technical requirements of the PWS, including whether the proponent has demonstrated an understanding of the requirements to provide support for the identified service. AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶ M.4.c.
In response to the RFP, the Army finally received five proposals, including proposals from IAP and Vectrus. AR, Table 41, Source Selection Decisions, pages 5-6. Related to this, the Source Selection Agency (SSA) evaluated the final proposals of IAP and Vectrus as follows:
As described below, SSA agreed with the assessment of the deficiencies in the IAP proposal by the lower-level assessors, that is, failing to adequately propose methods for providing external factory support in Iraq in accordance with PWS ¶ C.3.7.2. ID. 7. The SSA then continued to review the assessed strengths and weaknesses of the remaining four technically acceptable offers, including the IAP proposal. SSA found that the proposal provided a “clear distinction” under the most important management and technical sub-factors. ID. ; See also ID card. In 11-14 (the basis for the determination of weighing and weighing). The SSA chose to make the award decision based on the four technically acceptable initial proposals without discussion, because the SSA concluded that, given the obvious differences between the technically acceptable proposals, the discussion “will not The government, or any change in the apparent result of the source selection decision." ID. After 11. After completing the enhanced report, IAP filed this protest.
IAP posed many challenges to the agency's evaluation of the proposal and the resulting award decision. The protesters first argued that the agency had unreasonably evaluated the IAP proposal, believing that the Army had incorrectly assessed the flaws and other weaknesses of its proposal, and failed to assign advantages to the features of the IAP proposal that allegedly exceeded the solicitation requirements. IAP argued that the Army had made an unreasonable and unequal evaluation because the winner’s proposal should also be evaluated as flawed. The protesters further argued that it was wrong for the army to award rewards without discussion. Because of these so-called mistakes, the protesters argued that the resulting award decision was unreasonable. For the following reasons, we could not find a basis to maintain the protest.
As noted above, the Army’s technical approach to assessing IAP is flawed because the IAP’s proposal fails to demonstrate an adequate method to meet Iraq’s external equipment (OSP) service requirements. Specifically, the Army discovered the IAP proposal:
[D]o did not address the [OSP] technical requirements in paragraph C.3.7.2 of the PWS, which supports all Iraqi P/C/S. [IAP] proposes [DELETED], where [DELETED] is feasible. The lack of support for OSP requirements has created a gap in the ability to support OSP infrastructure at the P/C/S level in Iraq. The lack of OSP support in Iraq is a flaw because the proposal fails to provide OSP support in accordance with [RFP Technical Attachment 2], which specifies the locations and systems currently to be supported. The offeror’s approach increases the risk of unsuccessful performance of the contract to an unacceptable level because -
1. The offeror is not determined [deleted] will provide support.
2. Although the offeror proposed that [deleted] will provide OSP support, all locations of the offeror in Iraq have deleted [deleted].
AR, Tab 45c, Representative of the Source Selection Evaluation Committee, page 38 (internal reference to the proposal omitted).
IAP objected to the flaws in the assessment, arguing that the agency had unreasonably assessed the methods proposed by the protesters to meet Iraq’s OSP requirements. Based on our review of records, it is clear that the IAP's proposed solution to Iraq's OSP services is full of inconsistent and incomplete information. Therefore, as described below, we see no reason to support the protesters’ objections.
When reviewing protests that challenge the evaluation of the offeror’s proposal, it is not our responsibility to re-evaluate the proposal; instead, our office checks records to determine whether the agency’s judgment is reasonable and meets the bidding standards and applicable procurement regulations. Patriot Definition Grp., LLC, B-418720.3, Aug. 5, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 265 at 7. And allow the purchasing agency to conduct meaningful reviews. Applied Visual Tech., Inc., B-401804.3, August 21, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 261 at 3; ARBEiT, LLC, B-411049, April 27, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 146 at 4.
Related to this, one of the technical requirements listed by PWS is for contractors to provide OSP support. Specifically, the contractor will be responsible for maintaining, repairing and testing customer equipment, as well as maintaining the OSP infrastructure, including: maintenance hole wiring and hand holes; piping systems; copper and optical cables; main distribution frames; copper and optical cable ends Connection; treasury; multiplexing equipment; cross-connect system design; integration of the system into OSP infrastructure; OSP system quality assurance/quality control. AR, Table 7, RFP, amendment. No. 3, PWS, ¶ C.3.7.2.1.
As an example of assigned responsibilities, OSP technicians will be responsible for: (i) installation, disassembly, maintenance, repair and testing of multi-conductor antennas, underground and buried multi-purpose communication cables, including coaxial, optical fiber, and copper/traditional cables; ( ii) Maintain the connection and grounding of related telephone poles, manholes, handles, external terminals, joints, and terminal points; (iii) Manufacturing optical fiber, metal or coaxial cables. Same as above, ¶ C.3.7.2.2. In order to perform these duties, OSP technicians must be able to operate excavator derricks, bucket trucks, personnel lifts, backhoes and trenching equipment, and be qualified for fiber optic cable joints. ID. In addition, OSP technicians will need to conduct on-site surveys of service orders that require new installations, obtain excavator permits before starting excavation, and receive, process, coordinate, and recommend approval or disapproval of all excavation permit requests. Id., ¶¶ C.3.7.2.3-C.3.7.2.5.
Specifically in Iraq, RFP requires OSP technicians to provide support at 5 locations in the country 6 days a week and 10 hours a day. AR, Table 7e, RFP, amendment. No. 3, Revised Technology. Exit 2, in cells A69:L69. The Army estimates that it needs 12 full-time personnel (FTE) to provide the required services. AR, Table 8a, RFP, amendment. Number 4, attached. 8. The revised staffing estimates are in cells A:220-C:220, A:227-C:227, A:232-C:232, A:240-C:240, A:251-C: 251. A: 264-C: 264.
In response to PWS's overall requirements for internal factory (ISP) and OSP support, IAP explained that it "[REDACTED], where [REDACTED] makes it practical." AR, Table 16, IAP technology. The proposal is in volume. 2-72; see also ID card. In rolls. 2- 73 ("Our plans are [DELETED] and [DELETED], or according to needs, whether they are [DELETED] or not."). IAP further touted its method of integration support and explained that "[DELETED] integrates [DELETED] from [DELETED], [DELETED] integrates most of the tasks of [DELETED], using available [DELETED], greatly reducing [DELETED] ] Requirements and reduce the risk of [deleted]." Same as above, in the volume. 2-84.
This led to the first problem with the approach proposed by IAP in response to Iraq’s OSP requirements. Although the IAP’s technical description indicated that it would be [REDACTED], for Iraq, IAP proposed specific resources for performing OSP technical staff services in each of Iraq’s five P/C/S locations. Generally see Ibid., Basis of Estimate (BOE), pages 59-61. [2] Apart from this inconsistency, the IAP proposal has a second problem on this point. IAP’s technical description and accompanying staffing plan failed to provide detailed information about its supposed [REDACTED] resources for the provision of OSP services in Iraq. IAP's technical description does not specify who they are, where they are located, and how they will support all required onsite support in a timely manner.
There is also a fundamental disconnect between IAP’s technical narrative and its staffing information about the types of personnel that IAP intends to use to support Iraq’s ISP/OSP requirements. On the one hand, IAP’s technical specifications usually indicate that it will use [DELETED] to meet OSP requirements, but IAP’s Iraqi staffing information identifies the local [DELETED] to provide the required services.
Specifically, IAP’s technical description states that it will use OSP and/or ISP staff to meet OSP requirements:
[W]e Equipped with [DELETED] personnel with experience in reducing the number of personnel, or we will merge [DELETED] personnel with [DELETED] (if applicable). ... In smaller locations, if maintenance or repair requires a team of [DELETED] personnel to ensure safety, we will use [DELETED] to assist in working with [DELETED].
However, in Iraq, IAP did not recommend any OSP or ISP technicians to perform the required OSP support. Instead, the protesters proposed to allocate a local-based [DELETED] to perform the required OSP services. [3] See id., at 59-61 (reflecting that there is no FTE proposed for OSP technicians, and for the labor category of OSP technicians, IAP proposes "work code coverage assignment" for [DELETED]). Given these inconsistencies, the Army is confused about how the IAP intends to support the OSP requirements and which resources to use. On the one hand, IAP recommends centralizing the ISP/OSP technical staff team to provide the required services. On the other hand, IAP proposed a local-based [DELETED] for the services required by Iraq. These disconnects alone can support the Army’s apprehensions. However, the problem with the IAP proposal does not stop there. Further review of the IAP proposal provided additional support for the agency’s assessment deficiencies.
The IAP proposal does not provide any explanation on how [DELETED] can perform the required OSP services. In this regard, the labor category description of the OSP technician position proposed by IAP includes the following tasks: (1) Maintenance, repair and testing of customer equipment and OSP infrastructure; (2) Installation, disassembly, maintenance, repair and testing of multi-core overhead, Underground and buried multi-purpose communication cables, including coaxial, optical fiber and copper/conventional cables; (3) Operation of excavator derricks, bucket trucks, personnel lifts, excavators and trenching equipment; (4) Services that require new installations Order on-site investigation; (5) Correct the cable-related fault calls generated by the customer. Ibid., Bank of England, 183-184.
IAP also put forward specific education and experience requirements for its OSP technicians, including: (1) More than 2 years of on-site experience in OSP/line work; (2) OSP construction, buried, foundation, tower, overhead installation And other telecom experience; (3) have OSP equipment installation, disassembly and maintenance experience; (4) have experience in site surveys; have experience in optical fiber testing and splicing equipment; (5) have experience in operating vehicle-mounted aerial equipment; (6) Have experience in operating cable lashing equipment and other line work equipment; (7) Be able to carry out construction in environments with high physical requirements, including handling heavy equipment and climbing ladders; (8) Carrying capacity of 75-80 pounds. ID.
In contrast, the labor category description proposed by IAP for the [DELETED] position includes the following tasks: (1) Operate customer support assistance and workbenches; (2) Collect required job application forms and save all completed service orders Documents; (3) Ensure that technicians complete the work requirements correctly; (4) Ensure that the minimum data requirements are entered into the work order; (5) Provide customers with work confirmation and solutions, or work channels; (6) Contact customers Report the repair behavior and let the customer confirm the recovery operation before the ticket is closed. Ibid., 246-247.
IAP has put forward specific education and experience requirements for [DELETED], including: (1) from the beginning to [DELETED] using [DELETED] to manage [DELETED] experience; (2) able to [DELETED], pay attention to [DELETED], Understand how to [DELETED]; (3) powerful [DELETED] skills; (4) [DELETED] related experience, such as [DELETED]; (5) can be the focus of [DELETED] and [DELETED], perform [DELETED] ], assign [DELETED]; (6) Promote the ability of [DELETED] throughout the [DELETED] process. ID.
As mentioned above, OSP technicians-an architectural and physical maintenance position-and a [REDACTED]-an information technology position-are fundamentally different, with unique responsibilities and education/experience requirements. There is nothing in the IAP proposal to say how it will ensure that its [REDACTED] in Iraq will be eligible to provide the services envisaged and meet the unique education/experience requirements of these two positions.
In addition to failing to explain how [DELETED] is qualified to perform different job responsibilities and meet the minimum qualification requirements for OSP technicians, the proposal does not explain how [DELETED] can provide both help desk and OSP support. In this regard, in addition to the 12 FTEs expected to be provided for OSP technicians in Iraq, the RFP staffing estimate is also expected to provide 21 FTEs in the country for help desk support. See AR, Table 8a, amended. No. 3, revised annex. 8. Staffing estimates, in cells A:218-C:218, A:225-C:225, A:230-C:230, A:238-C:238, A:240-C:240, A :261 -C:261. Therefore, the RFP estimates that the staffing of the Iraqi OSP and service desk support is 33 full-time employees.
The IAP’s proposed [REDACTED] staffing in Iraq-they will support both the service desk and OSP requirements-range from [REDACTED] FTEs in the base period to the maximum of [REDACTED] FTEs in the option period. See AR, Table 16, IAP technology. Proposal, Bank of England, 59-61. Apart from IAP’s failure to explain how [DELETED] is qualified to perform OSP technician services, IAP’s proposal also fails to solve the problem of less than [DELETED] in the FTE expected by the service desk and OSP technician services. How can we fully perform the expected workload Two services.
We also found no reason to object to the Army’s concerns about the use of the IAP proposed use of the [REDACTED] method to support OSP technicians. As mentioned above, IAP proposes that [DELETED] will "If maintenance or repair requires a [DELETED] team to ensure safety, then [DELETED] will work with [DELETED]." Same as above, in the volume. 2 – 72. IAP reiterated that for security reasons, additional support for certain OSP work is important. ID. In rolls. 2-73 ("For safety reasons, OSP tasks usually require more labor, especially when operating heavy equipment and/or working in maintenance holes and other areas."). Despite the emphasis on [REDACTED] supporting safe OSP operations, IAP’s staffing plan proposes to eliminate all [REDACTED] in Iraq during the option year. Ibid., Bank of England, 59-61.
Instead of providing [DELETED] in the five covered P/C/S that require OSP services in Iraq, IAP recommends that [DELETED] services be allocated to [DELETED] located in RNOSC during the option year. ID. However, there is no explanation in the proposal as to whether [DELETED] will also provide support to OSP technicians. If so, how and on what schedule will [DELETED] at RNOSC support the 5 P/C/S position. Therefore, in this record, we find that there is nothing offensive about the Army’s assessment of concerns, that is, the IAP proposal fails to adequately address who, what, when, where, why, and how to satisfy the RFP’s mandatory OSP in Iraq. Proposed methods to support service requirements.
IAP also argued that even if the agency assessed the concerns as reasonable, the Army still incorrectly designated the defect. In this regard, the protesters argued that, given that the concern is limited to a PWS provision within a coverage area, the Army should reasonably assess its concern as constituting only a weakness. We believe that these arguments are of no value because they merely reflect the different opinions of the protesters on the weight of the concerns that are reasonably assessed. Undercover Training, LLC, B-418170, Jan. 9, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 25 at 6; Protection Strategies, Inc., B-416635, November 1, 2018, 2019 CPD ¶ 33 at 7.
The requirements clearly specified in the bidding are considered important to the government's needs, and proposals that do not meet the substantive terms and conditions of the bidding must be regarded as unacceptable and shall not form the basis for the award. ARBEiT, LLC, ibid. As with other aspects of the evaluation, the agency can decide on its own whether the failure of the evaluation meets the materiality standard specified in the solicitation. Unless the records show that the agency's behavior is unreasonable, our office will not replace the agency's judgment with our judgment. Enterprise Servs., LLC, B-417329 et al., May 30, 2019, CPD ¶ 205 at 10 in 2019; CACI Techs., Inc., B-408552, November 1, 2013, CPD ¶ 255 in 2013 at 9-10. In this record, we found that the Army reasonably evaluated the IAP proposal, which had flaws in its proposed method to meet Iraq’s mandatory OSP technical requirements; the protesters disagreed with the weight assigned to the Army’s reasonable assessment of concerns , No more, can not provide the basis on which we will interfere with the agency’s assessment.
Decided not to discuss
Next, the IAP protested that it was inappropriate for the Army to award Vectrus awards without discussion. In this regard, the protesters referred to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Section 215.306(c), which stipulates that “for procurements estimated to be worth $100 million or more, contract officials shall discuss.” As a result of this procurement estimate The value is more than 100 million U.S. dollars, so IAP insisted on the agency to discuss it.
The agency’s response first pointed out that the bidding allowed the offeror to understand the agency’s intention to award the bid without discussion. AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶¶ M.1.A and M.5; Table 8, RFP, amendment. No. 4, ¶ L.5.1. The agency further responded that its review of the initial proposal showed clear technical advantages and disadvantages to distinguish between proposals. In this regard, the Army received 5 proposals. After evaluation, 4 proposals were determined to be technically acceptable and the total evaluated price was fair and reasonable. See AR, Table 45e, Source Selection Decision, pages 5-6, 11-14. In addition, Vectrus' proposal is the only proposal that received the highest rating under the RFP's most important evaluation factor task support/technical and management sub-factors, which is the most important task support/technical sub-factor. ID.
We have explained that although DFARS Section 215.306(c) provides for the expectation of discussions on DoD purchases worth more than $100 million, the agency reserves the discretion not to discuss them based on the specific circumstances of each purchase. Omni2H, LLC, B-418655, July 16, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 239 at 6-7; Science Applications Int'l Corp., B-413501, B-413501.2, November 9, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 328 at 8-9. In this regard, we will review the agency’s decision to abandon the discussion, while taking into account various facts, including the notice issued when the intent was solicited; there are obvious technical advantages/disadvantages in the preliminary proposal; and submit a preliminary proposal that provides a fair and reasonable price. Novetta, Inc., B-414672.4, B-414672.7, October 9, 2018, 2018 CPD ¶ 349 at 22-23. We also recognize that institutions generally do not need to discuss with offerors who are technically unacceptable. Chenega Healthcare Servs., LLC, B-416158, June 4, 2018, 2018 CPD ¶ 200 at 5; SOC LLC, B-415460.2, B-415460.3, Jan. 8, 2018, 2018 CPD ¶ 20 at 8.
Here, we reject IAP’s assertion that the agency is required to discuss it. As mentioned above, RFP clearly recommends bidders three times. Although discussion is an option, the Army intends to award it without discussion. In addition, based on our review of records, the agency reasonably concluded that the original proposal showed obvious technical advantages and disadvantages among competing proposals. Specifically, the Army received five proposals, four of which are technically acceptable and fair and reasonable. The Vectrus proposal provides a unique advantage under the most important evaluation factor and the most important sub-factor corresponding to this factor. Finally, the agency reasonably determined that IAP submitted a technically unacceptable proposal because it failed to fully meet the material solicitation requirements. In this record, we do not believe that the agency’s decision to rule based on the original recommendation was unreasonable, and the IAP’s protest to challenge the decision was rejected.
As mentioned above, the Army reasonably believes that the IAP proposal is unacceptable and is not eligible for awards. AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶ M.1.A. Although IAP filed other allegations of protest and questioned the evaluation of its proposal and the Vectrus proposal, we found that IAP is not an interested party to pursue these allegations. According to our Bid Protest Regulations, if one party cannot obtain a ruling while the protest continues, then one party has no interest in maintaining the protest. 4 United States Code of Federal Regulations § 21.0(a), 21.1(a). In this regard, even if IAP wins the remaining challenges in its evaluation of its proposal and the Vectrus proposal, the protester will still not be the next winner if (i) the IAP proposal is still technically flawed and unqualified ( ii) In addition to Vectrus' proposal, the Army also received three technically acceptable proposals. See AR, Table 45e, Source Selection Decision, pages 5-6, 12-14. Therefore, because the Army reasonably believes that the IAP proposal is unacceptable and there are multiple technically acceptable intervention proposals, the protesters are not interested parties who question the agency's remaining evaluation of the proposal and the final decision. Barbaricum, LLC, B-418427.7, December 11, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 41 at 5; PAE Applied Techs., LLC, B-419133, November 4, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 363 at 10; Tyonek Worldwide Servs., Inc.; DigiFlight, Inc., B-409326 et al., March 11, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 97 at 7, Reconnaissance. Rejection, Tyonek Worldwide Servs., Inc.--Recon., B-409326.6, May 16, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 156.
Thomas H. Armstrong General Counsel
[1] The above acronyms are related to Information Technology (IT), Information Assurance Technology (IAT) and Information Assurance Management (IAM). See AR, Table 4, RFP, ¶ L.8.2(B)(3).
[2] The reference to the BOE page number of the IAP in its technical proposal refers to the Adobe PDF pagination of the version generated with the agency report.
[3] Iraq is the only country where IAP proposed to let [DELETED] supported by [DELETED] perform OSP tasks. In this regard, for all locations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, IAP proposes to provide the required OSP technician services through OSP or ISP technicians. Generally refer to AR, Table 16, IAP technology. Proposal, Bank of England, pp. 52-72.
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